With reference to the local authority decision

With mention to the local authorization determination doing procedure and the evidences of judicial reappraisal which arose in the instance, explicate why the tribunal found that the Council had acted unlawfully in R V Somerset CC, ex p Fewings [ 1995 ] 1 All ER 513.

This essay is chiefly concerned with the impression of judicial reappraisal and its handiness to dispute the determinations of public organic structures. This essay will concentrate on the judgement of Justice Laws in the instance of R. v. Somerset County Council, ex parte Fewings and others [ 1 ] . A brief lineation of the judicial reappraisal process will be given in order to set the instance into position. This essay will so travel on to analyze, in deepness, the judgement and conclude with the grounds behind the judgement.

In her book, Hilaire Barnett [ 2 ] defined judicial reappraisal:

“Judicial reappraisal represents the agencies by which the tribunals command the exercising of governmental power.”

Ms. Barnett goes farther to explicate that judicial reappraisal is merely available to ‘test the lawfulness of determinations made by public bodies.’ [ 3 ] In order to determine what a public organic structure is for the intents of judicial reappraisal, the tribunals will look at the maps of the organic structure. In order for a organic structure to be public in nature, it need non be governmental in signifier, but must exert some signifier of power, which is comparable to the power exercised by a governmental organic structure.

It should be emphasised that judicial reappraisal holds a supervisory place in our legal system, non an appellant 1. Therefore, the justice in judicial reappraisal proceedings can merely govern that a determination of a public organic structure is improper and offer one of the undermentioned redresss: a repressing order, once certiorari ; a prohibiting order, once prohibition ; a compulsory order, once mandamus. A repressing order consequences in doing the impugned determination nothingness. A forbiding order prevents a public organic structure from ‘acting or go oning to move outside its power or reverse to natural justice.’ [ 4 ] Finally, a compulsory order will coerce the suspect in the judicial reappraisal proceedings to execute the responsibility, which was imposed on it by jurisprudence. These three redresss are non the lone 1s available nevertheless ; farther analysis of the redresss available is beyond the range of this essay.

The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, implemented into UK jurisprudence by the Human Rights Act 1998 ensured that the tribunals must now guarantee that, in add-on to public governments moving intra vires, that is within their powers, they must move within Convention rights. Judicial Review has four chief aims, which the tribunals seek to continue:

  1. Acts of Parliament are interpreted right ;
  2. Discretion conferred by legislative act is exercised in a lawful mode ;
  3. The determination shaper has acted reasonably ;
  4. No human rights are violated as a consequence of exerting that power.

Judicial reappraisal is governed by subdivision 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.

The instant instance centred on a Council’s determination to censor stag runing on a piece of land it owned. The Council had appropriated the land by virtuousness of subdivision 122 ( 1 ) of the Local Government Act 1972 for the intent specified in subdivision 120 ( 1 ) ( B ) of the Act, viz. the ‘benefit, betterment or development of that area.’ At first, a declaration was passed to urge that runing be allowed to go on on the land, nevertheless, at a later, full local authorization meeting, a farther declaration was passed, saying that runing be banned on the land. This declaration was passed as the bulk of local council members who voted found deer runing to be morally abhorrent. It was held that the latter declaration would be quashed as the ‘words of subdivision 120 ( 1 ) ( B ) of the 1972 Act were non broad plenty to allow the local authorization to take a determination about activities on its land which was based on freestanding moral perceptual experiences as opposed to an nonsubjective judgement about what would contribute to the better direction of the estate.’ [ 5 ] The appliers sought judicial reappraisal of a Council declaration, which banned the hunting of cervid on Council land. The inquiry was ‘whether the councillors’ moral expostulations to the pattern of runing were capable of warranting the prohibition as a step which conduced to the benefit, betterment or development of their country within subdivision 120 ( 1 ) ( B ) of the Local Government Act 1972.’ [ 6 ]

The judgement of Mr. Justice Laws’ is rather extended and gives a batch of consideration to the background of the instance. The instance centres on the significance of ‘benefit, betterment or development’ of the country in inquiry provided by subdivision 120 ( 1 ) ( B ) of the Local Government Act 1972.

At page 525 of the judgement, the justice offers several illustrations of when a prohibition of the sort in this instance may carry through the intents of subdivision 120 ( 1 ) ( B ) . A prohibition may be justified if it has one peculiar characteristic:

“…the prohibition contemplated would objectively associate to the saving or improvement of the area’s amenities.” [ 7 ]

Justice Laws goes on to state that he can non see any justification for the prohibition in inquiry as it sprung from, or was fuelled by, the ‘ethical perceptual experiences of the council members about the rights and wrongs of hunting.’

Of class, the justice is non wholly blinkered and acknowledges there may be occasions when 1 must give some consideration to people’s ethical motives. However, he does profess that in this instance, consideration of people’s ethical motives is non the supervening consideration ; it would be portion of his compulsory footings of mention.

It was argued that when the Council acquired the land under subdivision 120 ( 1 ) ( B ) , they acquired rights over the land, which it could exert for whatever the Council considered to be good for the country. This would merely assist if it were demonstrated that by censoring hunting, the land would profit in some manner.

Justice Laws states that the preservation of the area’s wildlife as a consideration within the scope of subdivision 120 ( 1 ) ( B ) would affect anything more than the demand to look after the proper direction of the herd. This proper direction was acknowledged in the early phases of the judgement:

“..it is the being of the Hunt which leads many local husbandmans and landholders to digest harvest harm from the deer…Many people maintain that the disappearing of runing would finally take to…a steady addition in shooting…possibly ensuing in extinction [ of the cervids ] .” [ 8 ]

Justice Laws states that a hunting prohibition would interfere with the participants’ freedom and would therefore merely be justified if the Council concluded that such a prohibition was objectively necessary in order to pull off the herd in the most effectual manner. Any inquiry of ethical motives is non relevant.

He goes on to state that subdivision 120 ( 1 ) ( B ) does non entitle the Council to enforce its ethical motives on others. Opinions and ethical motives, harmonizing to Justice Laws, should rest in the ‘private scruples of their owners.’

A statement made by Alderson B in the instance of Calder and Hebble Navigation Co. v. Pilling [ 9 ] was endorsed by Justice Laws when it was said that if Parliament intends to confabulate power on a subsidiary organic structure to modulate the ethical motives of other people, it will take words which make it’s purposes absolutely clear.

Any issue of forbiding hunting is non an issue for a local authorization but should merely be considered by Parliament in their legislative capacity. So long as the activity in inquiry is allowable under general jurisprudence, it should non be prohibited merely because the decision-maker finds the activity morally obnoxious.

In decision, it has been clearly demonstrated throughout this essay that a repressing order was granted in this instance because the determination to censor runing on a piece of Council land was made, chiefly, on the footing of the moral expostulations of the council members.

After governing that the Council’s determination was improper, the judgement went on to detail the entries made by advocate for the claimant. The claimants were of the sentiment that notwithstanding the moral stance taken by the council members, the determination to censor hunting would still hold been improper because the Council failed to see the hereafter direction of the cervid if the prohibition went in front. In response to this, Justice Laws said:

“…even on the premiss ( which I have…rejected ) that the council members were entitled to hold respect to their moral positions as an independent consideration, the Council’s undoubted responsibility to see to the preservation of the herd required them…to signifier a judgement as to how…the preservation of the cervid was to be managed.” [ 10 ]

Had the prohibition been made on the footing that this was objectively necessary for the better direction of the herd or for the saving of the area’s comfortss, the result of the instance may hold been different. In this instance, it is apparent that ways to pull off the herd was non the chief consideration in forbiding hunting.

1503 words.

With mention to the local authorization determination doing procedure and the evidences of judicial reappraisal which arose in the instance, explicate why the tribunal found that the Council had acted unlawfully in R V Somerset CC, ex p Fewings [ 1995 ] 1 All ER 513.


Barnett, H. ,Constitutional and Administrative Law. Fourth Edition, Cavendish Publishing

Calder and Hebble Navigation Co. v. Pilling ( 1845 ) 14 M & A ; W 76.

Constitutional Law. Third Edition. Cavendish Lawcards Series. 2002.

Parpworth, N.Constitutional and Administrative Law. Second Edition. Butterworths Core Text Series. Butterworths, 2002

R. v. Somerset County Council ex parte Fewings and others [ 1995 ] 1 All E.R. 513