Why was the Rolling Thunder campaign launched

Why was the Rolling Thunder run launched during the Vietnam War, and to what extent was it successful?

Operation Rolling Thunder was an aerial bombardment run of heroic proportions carried out by the United States Air Force ( with the aid of Navy military planes and the South Vietnamese Air Force ) against North Vietnam from February 1965 to October 1968. Its purpose and range varied and evolved as clip went on – and non ever logically or successfully ; at foremost, it was intended to show to the authorities of North Vietnam that the United States would non be intimidated into endorsing down from its committedness to support South Vietnam from what it perceived an aggressive effort at a Communist coup d’etat. Second, it was intended to do harm to both the civilian, military, and economic substructure of North Vietnam in order to turn the tide of the war in favour of the South Vietnamese. The concluding constituent was the usage of the air run – surcease and recommencement in changing grades of strength – to either compel North Vietnam to prosecute in peace negotiations or to direct a message to North Vietnam that the United States was willing to speak peace itself.

Noted military strategian Karl von Clausewitz famously observed that “War is simply the continuance of policy by other means….The political object is the end, war is the agencies of making it, and agencies can ne’er be considered in isolation from their intent. ” ( Clausewitz, 1976, p. 87 ) Inasmuch as this is true, the usage of air power in war should ever be framed non merely from the position of battleground efficaciousness, but by inquiring whether or non the usage of air power helped accomplish the political end ( s ) behind war. Merely as the ill-famed organic structure counts employed by General Westmoreland, commanding officer of U.S. land forces during most of the Vietnam War, failed to win the war even if they won the conflicts, the comparative efficaciousness of the bombardment run could non be judged by the figure of marks destroyed. Ultimately, “the supreme trial of bombing’s efficaciousness is its part to a nation’s war aims.” ( Clodfelter, 1989,eleven) The United States’ war purposes were non merely misguided – far excessively many within both the civilian and military leading were unable position the Vietnam struggle outside of the paradigm of the Cold War outlook — but the war aims continued to switch randomly and radically over the nine old ages the U.S. was involved in the struggle and within the three old ages of Operation Rolling Thunder. Add to this already complicated image the considerable misinformation and propaganda engaged in by the military and authorities to paint an optimistic image to the American populace of the on-going success of the war attempt, and it is easy to see how hard it was to do an nonsubjective appraisal of how successful Operation Rolling Thunder was. Time, nevertheless, has non been sort in its rating. Despite blanketing Vietnam with more weaponries – 1.6 million dozenss — than were used in the entireness of the air attempt in World War II, Operation Rolling Thunder is however in retrospect “considered by many to be the greatest failed air run in history.” ( Wilson, 2001 ) .

What went incorrect? Was the air war executed displaying incompetence, unsuitably, or a combination of both? Or was there an overall strategic error ( i.e. , over-reliance on air power ) that doomed the operation to failure before it had even gotten off the land, no wordplay intended? The reply is likely a combination of both and the roots of its failure, finally, went far deeper than its executing.

Even though U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson won a popular election on his ain virtues in November of 1964 ( after being go uping to the presidential term due to the November 1963 blackwash of his predecessor, President John F. Kennedy ) , Johnson still really much felt compelled to prosecute Kennedy’s policy ends both domestic and foreign, including honouring what he felt was Kennedy’s promise to the South Vietnamese people that the U.S. would non let a Communist coup d’etat of their state. The North Vietnamese, led by Ho Chi Minh, viewed the struggle from a radically different position, believing that the war was an internal affair for the Vietnamese to settle on their ain. At best, it was a civil war which Ho believed should stop with the reuniting of his randomly partitioned state, and at worst, it was a war to emancipate Vietnam one time and for all of the colonial and imperialist subjugation and influence that the United States had volitionally inherited from its ally, France. Either manner, Ho Chi Minh wanted the United States out of Vietnam. He was a both a overzealous and patient adult male who viewed himself as a liberator and was an professed fan of the United States’ ain Declaration of Independence. ( Ho was non the lone patient member of his authorities. Other “leaders such as Le Duan and Nguyen Chi Thanh were profoundly and passionately committed to the end of finishing the revolution in South Vietnam. It was a end they had been prosecuting for virtually all of their grownup lives.” ( Thies, 1980, P. 400. ) ) Ho and others had expected the United States’ cooperation in prising the Gallic claws out of Vietnam in the decennary following World War II, but alternatively found themselves, due to their Marxist positions, on the incorrect side of the simplistic Communist/Capitalist worldview through which the United States viewed all of its foreign policy in the Cold War epoch. Johnson was either unaware of, or for political grounds chose non to see Ho Chi Minh in this less nearsighted context and branded him a dictatorial autocrat who would halt at nil to suppress the people of South Vietnam. ( Indeed, the tactics employed by both the North Vietnamese regular ground forces, and their Viet Cong insurrectionists, were as horrific and brutal as those employed by the United States. ) Determined to incorporate the spread of Communism, but loath to prosecute in a land war affecting the colossal figure of military personnels on a similar graduated table to the U.S.’ committedness in the Korean War, and besides eager to avoid pulling China and/or Russia into the Vietnamese struggle as had happened in Korea, Johnson elected to prosecute a limited war scheme predicated on the belief that the superior air power and engineering that the U.S. could convey to bear against North Vietnam would be plenty to win the war.

The initial belief was that a presentation of superior U.S. air power ( a predecessor, possibly, to the current U.S. military construct of ‘shock and awe’ as employed in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 ) would do North Vietnam to capitulate within a affair of hebdomads after bombing commenced in late February 1965. In late 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( The intra-department military direction commission comprised of the service leaders of each several subdivision of the U.S. military ) drew up a list of 94 possible bombing marks. However, in what was to go a consistent form for the continuance of the bombardment run, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, the intellectual ubertechnocrat Robert McNamara, hamstrung Operation Rolling Thunder by micromanaging planning and mark choice every bit good as carefully restricting the types of marks and the frequence of the onslaughts. Shockingly,

Decisions on what to bomb — and what non to bomb — were made at the ill-famed Tuesday Morning Luncheons. President Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security adviser McGeorge Bundy, and Press Secretary Bill Moyers attended these sole meetings. Not until October 1967 was a member of the armed forces included in this procedure. ( Wilson, 2001 )

Even the armed forces was curiously exclusionary. The Air Force was deplorably underrepresented in the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS ) mark recommendation procedure. This list, by the clip it reached the executing phase, was so cautious that for a good part of Operation Rolling Thunder, both the supply centres of Haiphong and countries surrounding China, every bit good as combatant bases, were off bounds and civilian countries. The North Vietnamese took advantage of this ‘gentlemanly’ scheme of the Americans and made certain to concentrate its most valuable military assets in the precise locations the Americans refused to assail. Furthermore, The North Vietnamese offered stiff opposition from both anti-aircraft arms and their ain Air Force ( comprised of Soviet-built MiG-21 combatant trade ) , and were able to accommodate both their tactics and practical operations due to the awkwardness of the American escalation. Last, it is of import to non fault the civilian leading wholly. Even some military leaders endorsed the limited bombardment paradigm: “Sections of the American military idea they could coerce the North Vietnamese to halt interfering in the South by bombing their fatherland. The believed that the North need non be defeated by a land war in the South.” ( Smith, 1995, p. 18 ) . This coincided handily with Johnson’s fervent hope – finally a tragic and conceited one — to work out the Vietnam job with minimum military engagement.

It is possibly unsurprising, so, that the initial bombardment run, March 2 to May 12, 1965, was barely the intimidating show Johnson had hoped for ; it lasted merely under two hebdomads, did non strike a meaningful figure of militarily or politically utile marks, and finally had the antonym of its coveted consequence ; if anything, it merely intensified the North Vietnamese decide to transport on their battle. Undeterred, Johnson decided to use a gradualist, carrot-and-stick attack to the war, which he described so:

I saw our bombs as my political resources for negociating a peace. On the one manus, our planes and our bombs could be used as carrots for the South, beef uping the morale of the South Vietnamese and forcing them to clean up their corrupt house by showing the deepness of our committedness to the war. On the other manus, our bombs could be used as sticks against the North, coercing North Vietnam to halt its aggression against the South. ( Kearns, 1976, p. 264 )

Consequently, the balance of Rolling Thunder was carried out in six unpredictably intensifying stages, due to a combination of political, military, and practical concerns. On a practical degree, the variable conditions over Vietnam, i.e. heavy cloud screen and rain present several months out of the twelvemonth, made bombing significantly more unsafe and imprecise. Politically, Johnson in vain and repeatedly ordered a arrest to bombardments to oblige the North Vietnamese to sit down at the negociating tabular array. Since the United States and North Vietnam had no formal diplomatic relationship, communications between the two authoritiess were carried out through sometimes complex and slow-moving ironss of mediators. In each instance, no affair how the extraordinarily persuasive Johnson attempted to wheedle Ho Chi Minh via personal letters or other diplomatic channels, the response was ever the same – merely a lasting and one-sided bombardment surcease, in tandem with an unconditioned backdown of U.S. forces from South Vietnam, was acceptable. Ho Chi Minh refused to even accept Johnson’s premiss of binding bombing arrests to beginning of dialogues, which led to a rhythm of bombing escalation followed by one-sided surcease followed by diplomatic decrease, ad infinitum. The escalations did hold military ends every bit good, and it is likely that the military efficaciousness, to the extent that any component of the bombardment run was utile, helped convey North Vietnam to the negociating tabular array in 1968 ( though it is of import to observe that the dialogues did non stop the war for another four old ages ) . Besides, the bombardment intermissions and incompatibilities within the run reflected deep divides within Johnson’s ain disposal and the necessarily hapless practical consequences of via medias within it. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara fretted in retrospect about the decision-making procedure:

Looking back, I clearly erred by non coercing. . . a powerful, drag-out argument over the loose premises, unsolicited inquiries, and thin analyses underlying our military scheme in Vietnam. I had spent twenty old ages as a director placing jobs and coercing organisations — frequently against their will — to believe profoundly and realistically about alternate classs of action and their effects. I doubt I will of all time to the full understand why I did non make so here. ( McNamara, 1995, p. 203 )

Distracted, arguably, by his wish to concentrate on domestic affairs such as his Great Society plans, President Johnson did non himself did non coerce such a argument, or instead, he was unable did non settle the argument one time and for all, and so war planning was mired in “fragmented argument, loose coordination, and an inordinate concentration on jobs of the moment.” ( Townsend, 1973, p. 2 ) The fog of war, so.

In any instance, the six staying stages of the run were as follows:

  1. May 18, 1965 – December 24, 1965. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy persuaded Johnson to spread out the range of the bombardment. Johnson approved enlargement of air onslaughts into district above the 20Thursdayanalogue, where 75 % of North Vietnam was located. Reflecting a more tactically aggressive stance, “Rolling Thunder missions progressively targeted truck convoys, turn overing stock, roads, rail, Bridgess, marshalling paces, supply terminals, and POL militias to control the North ‘s ability to export war-making stuffs to the South.” ( Wilson, 2001 ) Official combat land forces were introduced in July 1965. Still, the United States was in consequence still contending with the proverbial one manus tied behind its dorsum.
  2. January 31, 1966 – March 31, 1966. After a 37-day intermission within which Johnson’s diplomatic overtures to North Vietnam were rejected, bombing recommenced, but this clip restricted to marksbelowthe 20Thursdayanalogue.
  3. April 1, 1966 – February 6, 1967. It had become progressively clear that the 2nd stage of the bombardment was carry throughing following to nil politically and militarily. A military think armored combat vehicle had offered this inexorable rating of the air war to day of the month:

It is our feeling that so long as the present restraints on aims and operations remain every bit strong as recent Administration statements indicate, it becomes progressively dubious that the advantages of continuance or intensification of the onslaughts outweigh the possible cyberspace additions from, or at least, drastic and demonstrative de-escalation. ( Hoeffding, 1966, p. 32 )

Newsweekwas no less sort, offering a narrative titled “The Air War: Less Than a Success, ” which infuriated the press-obsessed Johnson. Ultimately, he and McNamara bowed to coerce from the Joint Chiefs to dramatically spread out the range and mark types covered by the bombardment. The entireness of North Vietnam was considered just game except: alleged ‘buffer’ zones between North Vietnam and China, to cut down the hazard of an inadvertent incident with the Chinese ; the metropolis centres of Hanoi ( North Vietnam’s capital ) and Haiphong. Besides included were marks along the Ho Chi Minh trail, a cardinal supply line for the insurgence into South Vietnam. It is deserving observing that during this clip – September 30, 1966 – that Undersecretary of State George Ball resigned. He had served in Johnson’s disposal as a ferocious opposition of any military intercession in Vietnam whatsoever and as a vehement, though loyal voice for peace overtures. His going helped tip the balance of power within the disposal towards a more militant stance, at least temporarily.

  1. February 14, 1967 – January 2, 1968. After another diplomatically ineffectual, albeit brief intermission, the bombardment attempts widened even further, with less limitations on marks in Hanoi and Haiphong. Included during this clip was a slightly eccentric bombing intermission of two yearss each at Christmas and New Years, possibly more of a public dealingss stunt for Christian/Western perceivers of the war, since a bombardment intermission during yearss which were non Vietnamese vacations carried minimum good will consequence.
  2. January 3, 1968 – March 31, 1968. This was the tallness of Operation Thunder’s strength and included the oppressing military licking of North Vietnam’s Tet Offensive by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces ; nevertheless, the Tet Offensive was a public dealingss success for North Vietnam in footings of planetary perceptual experience of U.S. advancement in stabilising South Vietnam. At the terminal of this period, Johnson – in yet another carrot component of his carrot-and-stick policy to oblige North Vietnam’s cooperation, once more restricted bombing to below the 20Thursdayanalogue.
  3. March 31, 1968-October 31, 1968. Gradually, as support for the war among the U.S. population eroded sharply, Johnson grew more cautious and finally restricted bombing to below the 19Thursdayanalogue, and finally announced – in close propinquity to his stupefying refusal to run for re-election as President – a complete arrest to all bombardment merely yearss before the U.S. presidential election.

By the beginning of 1969, when the North Vietnamese eventually sat down to speak peace with the U.S. and South Vietnam, the U.S. Department of Defense estimated Operation Rolling Thunder had cost North Vietnam an estimated $ 374 million in amendss while bing the United States more than $ 900 million, largely in the signifier of lost aircraft. It was a tactical failure, hampered by its incompatibility, “lack of monolithic application of force, surprise to the enemy, and concentration of forces.” ( Wilson, 2001 ) , and it was a political failure, “because it was non an effectual political instrument — it did non accomplish its declared end of obliging the North Vietnamese to make our will.” ( Wilson, 2001 ) Worst of all, possibly, it was a failure of imaginativeness — the United States’ military and civilian leading realized excessively late that a conventional application of military power was improbable to be successful in battling an unconventional scheme – i.e. guerrilla warfare – by the enemy. “Despite often saying that the Communist were carry oning guerilla warfare … the air power strong beliefs of civilian and military heads served as winkers befoging the true image of the Vietnam War.” ( Clodfelter, p. 118 ) Even though there is some historical grounds that the effects of Operation Rolling Thunder at its most unchecked and unrestricted phases had earnestly worried the North Vietnamese, the truth is that by the decision of the operation, Johnson had decided that the war could non be won militarily and that the United States had to acquire out before the public – already profoundly and violently divided over the war – turned against it overpoweringly. Richard Nixon, Johnson’s replacement as president, basically believed the same thing and though the bombardment runs carried out during his presidential term ( the ‘Linebacker’ operations, most notably ) were much more barbarous, it took four more old ages for the U.S. to eventually untangle itself from Vietnam. Ultimately, the eventual prostration of South Vietnam and the widespread historical belief that the U.S. lost the war is rooted in the fact that Operation Rolling Thunder failed. The lesson, possibly, other than possibly reenforcing that the United States should ne’er hold gotten involved to get down with, was that to utilize try the usage of air power as a tool of coercion alternatively of as a tool for triumph is a really hazardous gamble, peculiarly when applied inconsistently.

Bibliography

Thies, Wallace J.When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968. Berkeley Press, 1980.

von Clausewitz, Carl.On War, erectile dysfunction. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, 1976.

Clodfelter, Mark.The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam( The Free Press, 1989.

Wilson, Steven W. “Taking Clodfelter One Step Further: Mass, Surprise, Concentration, and the Failure of Operation Rolling Thunder, ”Air Power HistoryMagazine, Volume 48, December 22, 2001.

Kearns, Doris.Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream. Harper & A ; Row Publishers, 1976.

Smith, John T.Rolling Boom: The American Strategic Bombing Campaign

Against North Vietnam, 1964-68. Crecy Publishing, 1995.

McNamara, Robert S.In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. Times Books, 1995

Hoopes, Townsend.The Limits of Intervention: An Inside Account of How

the Johnson Policy of Escalation in Vietnam Was Reversed. McKay Publishers, 1973.

Hoeffding, Oleg. “Bombing North Vietnam: An Appraisal of Economic and Political Effects, ” RAND Memorandum 5213-1-ISA. RAND Corporation, 1966.

“The Air War: Less than a Success.”Newsweek, August 29, 1966, p.p 20-21.

Herring, George C.America ‘s Longest War: The United States and

Vietnam, 1950-1975.McGraw-Hill Publishers, 2002.

Thompson, James Clay.Rolling Boom: Understanding Policy and Program

Failure, University of North Carolina Press, 1980.

Pape, Robert A. , Jr. “Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War.”International Security, Vol. 15, No. 2, Autumn, 1990.

Drew, Dennis M.Rolling Boom 1965: Anatomy of a Failure. Maxwell

AFB, AL, Air University Press, 1986.

War in the Third Dimension: Essaies in Contemporary Air Power, edited by

R.A. Mason. Brassey ‘s Defence Publishers, 1986.